Escalating Tensions Over the Nile: Egypt’s Alliances and the GERD Crisis

Increased tensions over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) threaten a military conflict between Egypt and Ethiopia. Egypt’s reliance on outdated treaties, shifting alliances, and Ethiopia’s economic aspirations over Nile waters create a complex geopolitical landscape. Recent alignments of Somalia and Eritrea with Egypt against Ethiopia signify a significant shift. A new diplomatic approach is necessary to address the conflict sustainably.

In recent developments, Egypt’s position regarding the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) has become increasingly aggressive, raising concerns about a potential military confrontation with Ethiopia. Egypt has publicly allied with Somalia and has covertly sought support from Eritrea to oppose Ethiopia’s dam project, which is crucial for its economic advancement as it contributes roughly 85% of the Nile’s water supply. Egypt’s reliance on antiquated agreements, specifically the 1929 treaty and the 1959 accord, fails to align with contemporary geopolitical realities or the requirements of upstream nations such as Ethiopia. This reliance, compounded by evolving regional alliances and escalating tensions, has fostered an environment ripe for conflict over Nile resources. From mid-2014 until August 2022, Egypt enjoyed the support of South Sudan and Uganda as regional allies. However, its strategic efforts against Ethiopia faced significant local resistance, particularly from the Nuer community with historical ties to Ethiopia. Recently, a significant shift has occurred with Somalia and Eritrea, which were once seen as unlikely allies, now aligning with Egypt due to changing political dynamics. This new alignment is primarily motivated by two factors. Firstly, Somaliland, a self-governing region in Somalia, has entered into a deal with Ethiopia, granting it access to critical ports on the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea. The Somali government perceives this agreement as an infringement on its sovereignty, prompting threats to utilize all necessary means to obstruct Ethiopia’s use of Somaliland’s strategic ports. Secondly, within Ethiopia, dissatisfaction is brewing among the Fano militia, which is based in the Amhara region. The militia is discontented with the peace agreement concluded in November 2022 between the Ethiopian government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), feeling that Prime Minister Dr. Abiy Ahmed has veered from his reform agenda. The Fano militia has since established its presence in Eritrea, receiving paramilitary training and support amidst Eritrea’s own grievances with Ethiopia’s peace accord with the TPLF. In response, Egypt has seized the current geopolitical shifts as an opportunity to destabilize Ethiopia further. Cairo has reportedly begun to supply military resources to Somalia and is supporting the Fano militia through the Eritrean government, aiming to consolidate control over the Nile waters. Ethiopia, recognizing the threat, has preemptively suspended flights of Ethiopian Airlines to Eritrea, given Eritrea’s intentions to block such services by the end of September. Furthermore, access to Ethiopian Airlines’ bank accounts in Eritrea has been halted, complicating operational matters in that area. As tensions continue to mount, it appears that Egypt’s military strategy against the GERD is paving the way for potential regional conflict. This ongoing struggle over the Nile reflects broader historical grievances. Egypt’s efforts to stifle the development of the GERD began following Ethiopia’s announcement in 2011 but intensified notably after Dr. Abiy Ahmed assumed leadership in April 2018. Rather than persisting in the pressure against Ethiopia, Egypt should pursue a diplomatic solution that addresses the interests of all involved nations. Relying on outdated treaties will likely exacerbate existing tensions. Acknowledging the obsolescence of the 1929 agreement and seeking a collaborative solution with Ethiopia is imperative; employing proxies to fulfill anti-Ethiopian agendas will not yield a constructive resolution. In conclusion, achieving a mutually beneficial agreement between Cairo and Addis Ababa remains the most pragmatic path forward to address the ongoing conflict surrounding the utilization of Nile waters.

The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) is a significant hydroelectric project constructed by Ethiopia on the Blue Nile River. It is considered vital for Ethiopia’s economic development and energy needs. However, Egypt, which relies heavily on the Nile for its freshwater supply, views the dam as a potential threat to its water security. Historical agreements from the colonial period, namely the 1929 treaty and the 1959 accord, granted Egypt significant control over the Nile’s waters, but these agreements have been rendered outdated as upstream nations like Ethiopia assert their rights to utilize the river for development. The involvement of regional powers and new alliances further complicates the situation, raising fears of military escalation over water resources.

The tensions concerning the GERD between Egypt and Ethiopia highlight the pressing need for a modern and collaborative approach to Nile water management, taking into account the interests of all riparian states. Egypt’s attempts to maintain its historical water rights through pressure tactics or by engaging proxies have proven counterproductive. A negotiated settlement that is equitable for both parties is essential to averting further conflict and fostering stability in the region.

Original Source: www.radiotamazuj.org