Challenges Facing the DRC Army Against M23 Rebel Movement
The M23 rebel movement has captured strategic cities in the DRC despite the Congolese army (FARDC) being significantly larger. Systemic corruption, poor training, and inadequate resources hinder the FARDC’s effectiveness. President Tshisekedi has increased military spending, yet issues like nepotism and mismanagement persist. The substantial backing from Rwanda further complicates the situation, indicating a dire need for military reform.
Since January, the M23 rebel movement has captured Goma and Bukavu, two crucial cities in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and has established governance in the regions under its control. The Congolese armed forces (FARDC) numbered approximately 135,000 soldiers in 2022, according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, with indications that this figure may have risen. In contrast, the United Nations estimates that M23 consists of only a few thousand fighters, bolstered by about 4,000 Rwandan soldiers.
Despite a dramatic increase in military spending by President Felix Tshisekedi—raising it to $794 million (€732 million)—the question arises as to how M23 has managed to seize such significant territories in eastern DRC. Alain De Neve, a researcher at the Royal Higher Institute for Defence (RHID) in Brussels, attributes a substantial part of the FARDC’s weakness to systemic corruption, highlighting the misappropriation of funds intended for salaries and military logistics.
The depletion of resources has resulted in diminished morale among troops, leading to increasing instances of desertion. Reports indicate that some soldiers stationed in the eastern regions have resorted to looting or extorting local populations for survival. Ciaran Wrons-Passmann, director of the German Ecumenical Network for Central Africa, noted that the FARDC has transformed into a “self-service shop,” where military leaders exploit opportunities for personal profit.
Moreover, senior military officers in the FARDC often inflate the number of soldiers under their command, thus securing additional funding from the central government in Kinshasa, as observed by Jakob Kerstan of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation. This funding typically funnels through senior generals.
The FARDC has been described as a force crippled by deep-seated issues, including insufficient pay and corruption, which reform initiatives have repeatedly failed to address. Although the President announced better pay as part of military reforms, this compensation is still inadequate compared to mercenaries from Eastern Europe, who earn significantly more, as noted by Kerstan.
Another critical setback for the FARDC is a chronic lack of training and equipment. In contrast to M23, which benefits from structured training adapted to the mountainous terrain, the FARDC lags in technological advancement and logistical efficiency. Kerstan mentioned that the central command in Kinshasa is often unaware of the movements of army units across eastern Congo.
Military communication is sometimes conducted via WhatsApp, complicating command and coordination. De Neve pointed out that there exists a reluctance among the government to delegate real military authority to competent officers, fostering a culture of cronyism where loyalty rather than capability governs command appointments, leading to poor strategic decisions.
The challenges in recruiting loyal officers are evident, with consistent rotation among the chiefs of staff and intelligence services, indicating a lack of suitable personnel. Wrons-Passmann remarked that this reflects Tshisekedi’s ongoing struggle to find the right individuals to implement necessary military reforms, further complicating the military landscape.
Historically, the army has experienced divisions and betrayals, rooted in the legacies of past leaders. During President Mobutu Sese Seko’s regime, the army was intentionally weakened out of fear of coups. This tradition continued under Mobutu’s successors, where the army was infiltrated by foreign entities, namely Rwanda, which has bred reluctance to negotiate with M23 due to fears of further infiltration.
Tshisekedi acknowledged that the military faced internal betrayals, attributing failures in the FARDC’s ability to combat M23 to the robust support it receives from the Rwandan army. The well-organized structure of Rwanda’s military amplifies the challenges faced by the FARDC. Congolese officials affirm that reforms are underway but caution that progress will be gradual, as expressed by Patrick Muyaya, who indicated that comprehensive reform cannot be completed within a short time frame.
In conclusion, the Democratic Republic of Congo’s army struggles against the M23 rebel movement primarily due to systemic corruption, mismanagement, and a legacy of division. Despite increased military funding, the FARDC suffers from low morale, poor training, and inadequate equipment compared to M23, which benefits from structured support from Rwanda. The government’s reluctance to appoint competent officers and past betrayals within the military further complicate the already challenging situation, suggesting that significant reform is critical yet formidable.
Original Source: www.dw.com
