Russia and Iran: Navigating Diverging Interests in the South Caucasus
On January 17, 2024, Russia and Iran signed the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, aimed at enhancing cooperation. Despite this pact, significant diverging interests exist between the two countries, particularly concerning the South Caucasus region. Disagreements focus on energy projects, military alliances, and the development of strategic corridors, which may hinder effective collaboration.
On January 17, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian established the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, aimed at enhancing bilateral relations across several sectors. This treaty is intended to strengthen cooperation against NATO expansion, promote the North-South Corridor, and facilitate the 3+3 format. However, inherent conflicts of interest persist in their relationship, particularly in the South Caucasus region.
Moscow and Tehran share differing views on issues related to Abkhazia and South Ossetia’s independence from Georgia, in addition to their military ties with Israel and Azerbaijan. Economic discord is also evident, particularly in energy partnerships with Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, affecting transportation and natural gas exports.
A notable point of contention is the proposed Zangezur Corridor, which links Azerbaijan with its exclave Nakhchivan. Following Putin’s visit to Baku on August 18, 2024, Russia’s backing of this corridor has drawn criticism from Iran, as it may limit Iran’s borders and reduce its regional influence. Tehran is concerned that if this corridor is implemented, it could disrupt Iran’s only access route to Azerbaijan’s Nakhchivan region.
Iran anticipated a more neutral stance from Russia regarding the Zangezur Corridor. Moreover, the Iranian government has expressed its discontent over Moscow’s alignment with Azerbaijani interests in the border dispute. Maria Zakharova of the Russian Foreign Ministry acknowledged Iran’s concerns and claimed that Russia had clarified its positions.
Another area of conflict is the Aras Corridor, developed for a joint highway and railway project between Azerbaijan and Iran. This initiative is viewed by Tehran as a viable alternative to the Zangezur Corridor. Despite some cooperation in transport projects, Russia has not explicitly supported the Aras Corridor due to the Nagorno-Karabakh ceasefire agreement, which positions Russia to oversee transport links through Armenia, consolidating its regional influence.
Furthermore, the Iran-Armenia railway project is a source of competitive friction between the two nations, which could diminish Russia’s hold over Armenia’s transportation infrastructure. The partnership between Tehran and Yerevan on this project threatens to jeopardize Russian interests, as Russia owns the South Caucasus Railway in Armenia.
In terms of natural gas exports, both countries strive to secure their stakes in Armenia’s energy market, contributing to heightened competition. An extension of the gas-for-electricity swap agreement between Iran and Armenia indicates Tehran’s ongoing efforts to maintain its influence. However, Russian interference in the energy sector, exemplified by media reports of Gazprom’s dominance, hampers Iranian aspirations.
To summarize, while Russia and Iran maintain a cooperative partnership on numerous fronts, their conflicting interests within the South Caucasus serve as a significant obstacle to effective collaboration. The key issues surrounding energy, transportation, and regional influence necessitate careful diplomacy to avoid exacerbating divisions. Absent resolution of these diverging interests, the bilateral relationship may suffer further strains.
In conclusion, the relationship between Russia and Iran in the South Caucasus is characterized by a combination of strategic cooperation and conflicting interests. The Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership reflects intentions to strengthen ties; however, significant divergences in energy, transportation, and geopolitical influence pose persistent challenges. Unless both parties effectively address these issues, their collaboration in the region is likely to remain fraught with tension.
Original Source: jamestown.org
