Togo Considers Joining Alliance of Junta-Led Sahel States
Togo is seeking closer ties with the Alliance of Sahel States, which could enhance regional cooperation and port access for landlocked Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. Foreign Minister Robert Dussey has indicated that membership could aid combatting jihadism and strengthen economic ties. Critics warn, however, that this move might undermine Togo’s commitment to ECOWAS and deep tensions regarding governance may ensue.
Togo is actively considering collaboration with the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), which includes the junta-led countries of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. This potential alliance could significantly enhance regional cooperation and provide essential maritime access for the landlocked nations struggling under the pressure of jihadism. Foreign Minister Robert Dussey has expressed that Togo’s membership could facilitate strategic partnerships and expanded trade opportunities by utilizing its ports.
The AES was originally established as a defense pact in 2023 but now aims for deeper integration among its members. Access to maritime routes is critical for Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, especially as tensions with neighboring Ivory Coast and Benin hinder their logistics. Analysts, such as Madi Djabakate, predict that Togo’s inclusion might lead to greater economic solidarity and improved military cooperation, especially in combating the rising jihadist threat within the region.
The juntas governing the AES countries have faced challenges in combating jihadism since their respective takeovers between 2020 and 2023. They plan to form a joint military force of 5,000 troops to bolster their security strategies. Togo supports the AES’s approach to reclaiming sovereignty and has developed closer ties with Russia and alternative partners, aligning with a broader pan-African narrative.
Togo’s shift towards the AES may also serve as a diversion from local political controversies, particularly regarding the new constitution that critics argue could enable President Faure Gnassingbe to remain in power indefinitely. Sociologists note that this trend reflects a shared reluctance among AES nations to transition to democratic rule, a sentiment echoed by opposition leaders in Togo.
The potential alliance with the AES raises concerns among Togo’s political opposition, particularly regarding the implications for its relationship with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Critics suggest that such a shift might shield Togo’s government from ECOWAS’s oversight on democratic governance. Meanwhile, Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso have distanced themselves from ECOWAS, blaming it for being overly influenced by French interests.
Despite a growing closeness with AES, Togo is unlikely to break away from ECOWAS entirely, given that its Lome port is crucial for regional trade. Djabakate argues that simultaneous membership in both alliances is feasible. However, some experts predict that Togo’s alignment with the AES could accelerate the fragmentation of ECOWAS, leaving an uncertain outlook for regional politics.
Togo’s interest in joining the Alliance of Sahel States reflects a strategic effort to bolster regional ties and enhance economic opportunities, particularly in maritime access. As Togo navigates its relationships with both AES and ECOWAS, the political landscape remains complex, influenced by security concerns and the balance of power in West Africa. The potential alliance may offer Togo avenues for military collaboration and economic solidarity, yet it simultaneously raises questions about the future stability of ECOWAS and democratic governance in the region.
Original Source: thedefensepost.com
