Rising Tensions Signal Potential Eritrea-Ethiopia Conflict
The article discusses the rising likelihood of conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia, as indicated by General Abebe Teklehaymanot (Jobe). He highlights military mobilizations and underlying motivations, such as territorial control and regime change. Additionally, Jobe points out potential interventions by other powers and reflects on historical failures to address the situation, warning that Tigray may become the primary theater of war if tensions escalate.
Recent predictions by politicians and military figures suggest an increasing likelihood of conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia. This comes after the relationship between Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki and Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed deteriorated sharply within three years, leaving the underlying reasons unclear to the public. General Abebe Teklehaymanot, known by his nom de guerre Jobe, noted the possibility of war during a recent interview, emphasizing the countries’ military mobilizations and exchange of accusations.
Jobe, a former commander of the Ethiopian Defense Force, articulated that the outcomes of a potential conflict remain unpredictable. He highlighted two primary motivations that could drive this war: the desire to seize the port of Assab in Eritrea and the aim to dismantle the ruling People’s Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ) led by Afwerki. This desire for regime change purportedly aligns with the aspirations of several politically active Eritreans who once believed in U.S. support, though this perception shifted under the Trump administration.
Moreover, Jobe suggested that external powers, such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United States, might intervene in the conflict for their strategic interests. He reflected on the missed opportunity during the 1998-2000 war to neutralize the PFDJ, noting that internal disagreements within the TPLF-led government impacted the military’s approach to Eritrea. The eventual victory of Meles Zenawi’s faction curtailed alternative strategies.
In his criticism, Jobe questioned the decision to allow Eritrea to rebuild its military capabilities post-2000. The situation developed into years characterized by “no peace, no war” until Abiy Ahmed’s efforts to normalize relations in 2018 unraveled within three years. He now expresses fears that if hostilities resume, Tigray may emerge as the primary battlefield in the conflict.
The potential for renewed conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia appears imminent, driven by historical grievances and existing military preparations. The motivations for war, including territorial ambitions and regime change, coupled with possible interventions from regional powers, underscore the complexities of the situation. Jobe’s insights reflect a deep-seated concern for the implications such a conflict may have on the region, particularly Tigray. The history of failed diplomatic initiatives further illuminates the volatility of this relationship and the precariousness of peace in the Horn of Africa.
Original Source: borkena.com
